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I. INTRODUCTION
Many attorneys employed by large law firns are frustrated by their need
to produce high-quality and high volume work product under short deadlines.
Their situations are complicated by the need for them to please multiple masters.
These demands engender complex ethical issues, particularly where a formal
system to identify and resolve moral dilemmas is absent or underutilized. Even
if attorneys examine a jurisdiction's rules governing their professional conduct,
they are likely to find that such rules are not only ambiguous, but appear to be
written primarily with a solo practitioner or small law firm in mind, working
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almost exclusively on legal matters that never involve the application of the law
of more than one state or country.
In many large firms, the relationships that associates and non-equity
holding lawyers have with one another and their law firms have many of the
characteristics of corporate employees. Today, fewer attorneys function as pro-
fessionals who exercise their own judgment on substantive matters. Further-
more, lawyers at large law firms often lack an identity of interests with those of
their employers, colleagues, and clients.
Typically, a corporation's general counsel will select one or more law
firms to handle its outside legal work. The arrangements between the corporate
clients and their law firms are typically embodied in retainer agreements, and
not with individual attorneys at the firms. This occurs even though corporate
general counsels may want specific attorneys at a law firm to handle or super-
vise their corporation's matters. Unless otherwise agreed, law firms typically
have discretion in staffing assignments for their clients. It is not unusual that
lawyers who work on a particular client's matter will have only a minimal
knowledge of the corporate client's goals, and may never have direct contact
with corporate client's personnel. Indeed, some corporations are trying new
approaches in their dealings with outside counsel. 
1
To complicate the situation, today's lawyers are increasingly expected
to take into account their obligations with respect to their clients (i.e., the legal
entity and its owners) as well as other stakeholders (including the public).
Regulators, legislators, reporters and the public are increasingly questioning
certain fundamental assumptions underlying the lawyers' professional conduct.
This dynamic situation has and will continue to generate novel legal and ethical
issues for lawyers serving corporate clients.
This article examines whether the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") are providing lawyers at
large law firms sufficient guidance concerning how to uphold their ethical obli-
gations, while at the same time advancing their clients' and protecting their em-
ployers' interests. 2 On first impression, it seems that some complex ethical is-
See Ron Peppe and David G. Briscoe, "Strategize This: Rethinking Outside Counsel Use,"
ACC Docket, Vol. 22, No. 9, at 24-44, (October 2004) (discussing management techniques for
more cost-effective use of outside counsel); see also James R. Buckley, "Welcome to Lawyerland:
Why Even Brilliant Outside Counsel Cost Too Much, " ACC Docket, Vol. 23, No. 1, at 22-32
(January 2005) (an inside counsel of a major corporation's analysis of how a law firm's organiza-
tion and culture drives up the cost of legal services).
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2004). Terminology does not explicitly define
"lawyer" - the meaning of which can be gleaned from the Model Rule's Preamble - A Lawyer's
Responsibilities and other provisions. In contrast, a "[firm" or "law firm" is defined as "a lawyer
or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association
authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal de-
partment of a corporation or other organization."
[Vol. 107
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sues arise because ultimately the attorney-client relationship is a product of per-
sonal interactions. The interests of attorneys who directly deal with corporate
clients' personnel may differ from that of their law firms. Similarly, under U.S.
law, a corporation is a legal person, the interests of which are not always the
same as those of corporate management. Furthermore, the fact that corporate
management pays for legal services with someone else's money (i.e., the legal
entity and ultimately the owners) produces a different dynamic than when an
individual is the client.
This article is organized into five sections. The first section examines
the subordinate attorney's obligations as set forth in the Model Rules. Most
states rely on the Model Rules as a starting point for developing their own rules
regulating the practice of law. This means that while the rules in all states are
not the same, they are similar. The second section identifies certain practical
dilemmas for lawyers assisting corporate clients to obtain their business objec-
tives. The third section analyzes management strategies to minimize the poten-
tial consequences of a difference between the interests of the client and its law
firm (outside counsel). The fourth section discusses certain ethical dilemmas
that can arise under the Model Rules and also identifies areas where state legis-
latures and the courts might act to reduce the gap between professional ideals
and practical realities. The last section examines different approaches for estab-
lishing a more user-friendly foundation for the ethical conduct of lawyers ser-
vicing corporate clients.
II. LAWYERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force (the "Task Force")
on Corporate Responsibility Report (the "Report") concluded that lawyers play
an important role in the proper governance of public corporations. 3 The ABA
House of Delegates approved the bulk of the Report's analysis and recommen-
dation, after making certain minor revisions.4  The final version of the Report
observes:
Lawyers are and should be important participants in corporate
governance and important contributors to corporate responsibil-
3 The Task Force issued a preliminary version of this report two weeks before Congress en-
acted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See generally, Chi Soo Kim & Elizabeth Laffitte, The Potential
Effects of SEC Regulation of Attorney Conduct Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [of 2002], 16 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 707 (2003) (discussing whether ethical rules for lawyers should be federalized
and noting that in accordance with the Act's § 307, the Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated rules establishing "minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys" who
practice before the SEC).
4 See ABA Website, ABA House of Delegates Adopts Policies Recommended By Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
(last visited Sept. 2, 2004). The ABA House of Delegates issued its own document approving the
Report, but noted certain positions it did not endorse.
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ity. Lawyers employed by the corporation and outside lawyers
retained by the corporation often serve as key advisers to senior
management and usually participate in the negotiation, structur-
ing and documentation of the corporation's significant business
transactions. Additionally, lawyers often serve as counselors to
the board to assist it in performing its oversight function. In
such roles, lawyers obviously do and should play a critical role
in helping the corporation recognize, understand and comply
with applicable laws and regulations, as well as to identify and
evaluate business risks associated with legal issues. The Task
Force believes that a prudent corporate governance program
should call upon lawyers - notably the corporation's general
counsel - to assist in the design and maintenance of the corpo-
ration's procedures for promoting legal compliance.
This conception of the lawyer as a promoter of corporate com-
pliance with law emanates from the basic values of the legal
profession. It follows naturally from the ABA's goal "to in-
crease public understanding of and respect for the law, the legal
process, and the role of the legal profession." It is also in keep-
ing with the [Model Rules], which emphasize the lawyer's re-
sponsibility "[als advisors [to] provide[] a client with an in-
formed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations
and explain their practical implications.
5
The Report states that the Model Rules 6 support effective corporate governance
in a variety of ways, such as by requiring lawyers to:
(i) be competent;
7
(ii) respect a client's right to determine corporate objectives;
8
5 Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, at 20-21
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final report.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2004). The Task Force's Preliminary Report was published at 58 BUs. LAW. 189
(2002).
6 In 1908, the American Bar Association issued the Canons of Ethics. In 1969, the ABA
developed the Model Code of Professional Responsibility to replace the Canons. Then in 1983,
the ABA came out with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which more clearly set out
standards for attorney conduct. The ABA continues to amend this last document in order to ad-
dress issues as they arise. In addition, the ABA issues non-binding ethics opinions. Courts, bar
counsel, and other rule-establishing bodies are often influenced by these opinions.
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 & 1.3.
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.
[Vol. 107
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(iii) assist the manner by which the client pursues its objective,
(presumably in a lawful manner);9
(iv) preserve client confidences; ' 0 and
(v) avoid conflicts of interest.
1
Furthermore, the Report properly notes that:
lawyers for the public corporation must bear in mind that their
responsibility is to the corporation, and not to the corporate di-
rectors, officers or other agents with whom they necessarily
communicate in representing the corporation. This is the bed-
rock principle recognized in Rule 1.13(a) of the Model Rules.
Outside lawyers retained by the corporation and lawyers em-
ployed by the corporation both must exercise professional
judgment in the interests of the corporate client, independent of
the personal interests of the corporation's officers and employ-
ees.
The Task Force took the position that lawyers for a corporation, both in-house
and outside counsel, were not "gatekeepers;" i.e. agents of regulatory or law
enforcement bodies. This role is similar, but not identical to that of accounting
firms performing audits for publicly traded corporations. 13  Nevertheless, in
addition to having the duty to protect their clients' interests, lawyers are obliged
to exercise independent judgment (while not facilitating their clients' and their
agents' unlawful acts).
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.2(a)(s).
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
11 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 & 1.7; see also Report, supra note 5, at21-22.
12 Report, supra note 5, at 23.
13 Report, supra note 5, at 22-24; see Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in
Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 401-411 (2004) (differing
evaluations of risk depend on information asymmetry and cognitive bias); see also David A.
Skeel, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. By Reinier
Kraakman, et al., New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, 113 YALE L.J. 1519 (2004) (discuss-
ing in part that gatekeeper regulation can improve but not solve the gatekeeper-agency problem.
The existence of significant financial rewards makes the existence of rules of limited value where
corporate management is inclined to run risks and the punishments for "white collar" crime not
particularly severe. Furthermore, gatekeepers within law firms are subject to the same temptations
as corporate management. Nonetheless, law, rules and regulations, if controls are well crafted and
rigorously enforced and where whistle blowing is encouraged, may have a deterrent effect).
2005]
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In recent days, however, many legislators and regulators have demon-
strated that they did not fully share this longstanding view. 14 The inviolable
relationship between lawyer and client, which is based in part on principles of
fiduciary duty and the confidentiality of attorney-client communications, has
apparently lost its sanctity. Some legislators and regulators seem to have
adopted the view that under certain circumstances lawyers indeed should act as
gatekeepers. A lawyer fulfilling a gatekeeper function in essence fulfills a gov-
ernmental regulatory or law enforcement role, the implication of which is that
lawyers also have obligations to the public's interest. 
15
Some critics of this development contend that making lawyers gate-
keepers burdens them with incompatible conflicts of interests, which clash with
lawyers' numerous duties to their clients and jeopardizes the clients' ability to
communicate honestly with their lawyers, fearing certain disclosures made to
their lawyers will not enjoy confidentiality. 16 In addition, there is the practical
concern that many lawyers lack the substantive knowledge to perform ade-
quately gatekeeper tasks, a willingness to put the government's (or public's)
interest ahead of their own, as well as determining what punishments are appro-
priate if a lawyer knowingly puts his clients' interests first. 17
Organized groups representing the interest of segments of the legal
community have been largely successful in preventing Congress from imposing
gatekeeping responsibilities on lawyers. 18 There have been two notable excep-
tions: (i) the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 (the "Patriot Act") 19 and (ii) the Sar-
14 Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future En-
rons? 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2003) (contending requiring lawyers to act as corporate gate-
keepers is not a panacea for corporate governance problems); Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-
Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers' Profes-
sional Conduct, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (contending that Sarbanes-Oxley in isolation confuses
rather than clarifies what is required of lawyers acting as "gatekeepers"); but see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: the Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301 (2004) (rejecting the conventional wisdom by advancing the view that imposing gate-
keeper obligations on attorneys will increase their leverage over their clients).
15 Id.
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information & R 1.7 - Con-
flicts of Interest, Current Clients (along with their respective comments); see generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (A Summary of the Duties
under the Client-Lawyer Relationship).
17 Fisch & Rosen, supra note 14.
18 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 67-
114 (2000) (Professors William Eskridge, Phillip Frickey and Elizabeth Garrett provide an exami-
nation of the ability of organized groups to influence the legislative process and achieve their
objectives.).
19 The full name of the Patriot Act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). Congress adopted
the USA Patriot Act with little debate and virtually no detailed examination of the Act's substan-
[Vol. 107
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banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (popularly known as "SOX"), both of which were
adopted in response to national crises, the former law responding to the trauma
of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the latter at a time when public confidence in
"Corporate America" and the stock market had precipitously dropped following
a waive of major corporate and financial scandals. In both instances, Congress
"deputized" lawyers to serve as regulatory gatekeepers. 2 1  Not surprisingly,
various organizations of lawyers have sought to reduce the possibility that the
Patriot Act 22 and SOX would interfere with their existing obligations to their
clients.
23
tive provisions, including those dealing with terror financing and money laundering. Immediately
after 9/11, few if any legislators were willing to entertain the political risk of questioning the
additional powers granted to the federal government to combat terrorism. For a skeptical analysis
of the Patriot Act's anti-terrorist financing provisions, see Ethan S. Burger, Why Following the
Money Won't Stop Terrorist Financing, BANK SECURITY NEWS, Vol. 2, No. 8 at 10-11 (Oct. 27,
2004).
20 The full name of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is Act To Protect Investors by Improving the Ac-
curacy and Reliability of Corporate Disclosures Made Pursuant to the Securities Laws, and for
Other Purposes, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley
072302.pdf (last visited June 14, 2004).
21 See Edward J. Krauland and Benjamin Coats, International Regulation of the Legal Profes-
sion: An Impending Possibility? INT'L L. NEWS, Spring 2004, at 6-8, and Kevin L. Shepard, USA
Patriot Act and the Gatekeeper Initiative: Surprising Implications for Transactional Lawyers,
A.B.A. PROBATE & PROPERTY, Oct. 1, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publica-
tions/magazine/2002/so/shepherd.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
22 The United States is a member of the Financial Activities Task Force ("FATF"). After the
9/11 terrorist attacks, FATF adopted 40 "Special Recommendations" to combat terrorist financing.
This document would appear to call for lawyers to conduct client due diligence and perform re-
cord-keeping activities in the same manner as financial institutions. Special Recommendation
12(d) provides:
Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants
when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the
following activities:
" buying and selling of real estate;
" managing of client money, securities or other assets;
" management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
" organi[z]ation of contributions for the creation, operation or manage-
ment of companies; [and]
% creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements,
and buying and selling of business entities.
The 40 Recommendations of the Financial Activity Task Force on Money Laundering, June 20,
2003, at 7, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/fiu/fiue/fmeO0l a.pdf (visited Feb. 11, 2005).
There has been considerable concern within the legal community that lawyers were being made
subject to rules requiring them to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) (reporting transactions
above S10,000) and suspicious activities reports (SUAs) as required under the Bank Secrecy Act,
as amended by the Patriot Act, which now provides an expanded list of entities falling within the
2005]
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Many of those lobbying on behalf of the legal community sought to
minimize a lawyer's obligation to society. Such efforts continued after the
adoption of the aforementioned legislation, largely focusing on the agency rule-
making process. At present, these two Acts remain notable exceptions to the
principle that attorneys are not gatekeepers for the public. The future impact on
the practice of law of assigning gatekeeper roles is difficult to predict. Tradi-
tionally, lawyers were prohibited from assisting clients in the commission of a
crime or other wrongdoing, but now they are being asked to report arguably
improper conduct to the authorities. This development may have a chilling ef-
fect on attorney-client communications.
Similarly, it is not clear that lawyers have adequately fulfilled their
gatekeeper roles with respect to the owners of their corporate clients. Notably,
the Task Force observed that the existing Model Rules do not deal with the real-
ity of how lawyers provide services to corporate clients:
This Report continues the practice traditionally used in the
Model Rules of speaking about responsibilities of individual
lawyers. However, in many cases involving the representation
of publicly held corporations, the corporate client is advised by
a law firm. The interplay of lawyer obligations to the corpora-
tion and lawyer obligations to each other in the context of law
firm practice are generally addressed in Model Rules 5.1 and
5.2. A direct, detailed analysis of the responsibilities of a law
firm and the lawyers within the firm and the procedures that
would facilitate discharge of their responsibilities would be a
useful addition to the literature on professional responsibilities,
and the Task Force recommends that an appropriate committee
of the ABA undertake such an analysis.
24
definition of "financial institutions." To date there have been no special requirements established
for lawyers. Nonetheless, in April 2003, the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (the U.S.
financial intelligence entity) gave notice of a proposed rulemaking concerning persons involved
with real estate transactions. Financial Crimes Enforcement: Anti-Money Laundering Program
Requirements for Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings and Settlements, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,569
(April 10, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103). To date, there have been no final regula-
tions issued in this area, though the ABA is closely monitoring developments in this area. Under
certain circumstances, various provisions of the Patriot Act's anti-money laundering provisions
and their implement regulations might cover individuals who are lawyers.
23 Bernard S. Carrey, Enron-Where Were the Lawyers? 27 VT. L. REv. 871 (2003) and De-
velopments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2169, 2227 (2004) (both
items largely discussing the implication of SOX's requirements, the need for security law reform,
the confidentiality of attorney-client communications and the Model Rules).
24 Report, supra note 5, at 35 n. 66.
[Vol. 107
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While there are some formal (and informal) efforts underway, the ABA has not
completed its work in this area.25
The Task Force proposed 12 recommendations for improving corporate
governance, each of which largely concerns changes to the operation of a corpo-
ration's board of directors, management, the conduct of lawyers (both in-house
and outside counsel), as well as the role of other institutions (the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), courts, state attorney disciplinary authorities,
etc.) to improve the effectiveness of corporate controls and compliance with
relevant requirements. 26
The Report concludes with specific recommendations to modify the
Model Rules, which the ABA House of Delegates largely accepted in their en-
tirety. 27 The Task Force subsequently prepared a second report in conjunction
with the resolution being considered at the time by the ABA House of Delegates
(hereinafter the "Report for ABA House of Delegates"). 28 On August 12, 2003,
after considerable debate, the ABA House of Delegates accepted the latter ver-
sion of the Task Force's recommendations concerning the responsibility of law-
yers representing organizational clients. Generally, the House of Delegates
thought the amendments to be necessary to make the Model Rules consistent
with the requirement imposed by SOX to "report up the ladder," pursuant to §
307.29
25 Nicole Kroetsch & Samantha Petrich, Task Force on Corporate Responsibility: Should the
American Bar Association Adopt New Ethics Rules? 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 727 (2003) (noting
that the Task Force's Report, had the objective of creating a guide for corporate lawyers who are
confronted with misconduct by corporate officers and insiders, but did not complete the task. The
authors provide an assessment and offer recommendations for amending the Model Rules since, as
the Task Force admits, the "Model Rules currently encourage lawyers to go beyond legally re-
quired minimum standards and consider the moral and ethical considerations of situations and
decisions."); see Rachel Reiland, The Duty to Supervise and Vicarious Liability: Why Law Firms,
Supervising Attorneys and Associates Might Want to Take [a] Closer Look at Model Rules 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1151 (2001) (arguing that the existing rules in the area are
inadequate and calling for a re-examination of the area); see also Ethan S. Burger, The Use of
Limited Liability Entities for the Practice ofLaw: Have Lawyers Been Lulled into a False Sense of
Security?" 40 TEX. J. Bus. L. 175 (2004) (contending that often liability described as "vicarious"
can also be properly classified as "direct.").
26 Report, supra note 5, at 12.
27 Report, at 77-89 available at http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/final
_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
28 The Report for the ABA House of Delegates is available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw
/corporateresponsibility/final report.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). It consists of 17 pages.
29 There was considerable opposition by some lawyers to the amendments to Model Rule 1.13.
The opponents advanced various arguments against the proposed changes such as the claim that
the relationship between corporate wrongdoing and the role of the lawyer was not well estab-
lished, and that the new rules could have unforeseen consequences in their impact on attorney-
client relations. Furthermore, since the Model Rules applied to all organizations, not just publicly
owned companies, too much power and responsibility was being placed in the hands of lawyers.
See ABA Amends Ethics Rules on Confidentiality, Corporate Clients, to Allow More Disclosures,
2005]
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LAWS. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT NEWSL (ABA/BNA) Aug. 13, 2003, at 467. The states have not
uniformly accepted the changes to the Model Rules. For example, while Louisiana amended its
own ethical rules along the lines proposed by the ABA, Pennsylvania did not follow the ABA's
lead. See Louisiana Adopts Rule Changes That Mostly Conform to ABA Models, LAWS. MAN.
PROF. CONDUCT NEWSL (ABA/BNA) Feb. 11, 2004, at 70; Pennsylvania Rule Amendments Con-
tain Numerous Departures from ABA Model, LAWS. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT. NEWSL. (ABA/BNA)
Sept. 8, 2004, at 8.
To make Model Rule 1.6 consistent with existing law and policy objectives, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the addition of two new sub-paragraphs to paragraph (b), so the rule now
reads:
Model Rule 1.6, CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION, [as amended
August 11, 2003, American Bar Association House of Delegates, Denver,
Colorado, Report No. 119A]:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of
a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impli-
edly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure
is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial in-
terests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client
has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or
has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in fur-
therance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;
or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
The Commentary for Rule 1.6, was also changed to be consistent with the revised paragraph (b).
Similarly, the ABA House of Delegates approved major changes to Model Rule 1.13. These
changes are largely found in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d):
Model Rule 1.13 - ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT [as amended August 12,
2003, American Bar Association House of Delegates, Denver, Colorado, Re-
port No. 1198].
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the or-
ganization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, in-
tends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that
[Vol. 107
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is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of
law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organi-
zation. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in
the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the
matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by
the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists
upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action
or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if
and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to
a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged
violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee
or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim
arising out of an alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged
because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or
who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to
take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest
authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, mem-
bers, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the iden-
tity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constitu-
ents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent
to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be
given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the indi-
vidual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
Not only was Model Rule 1. 13, changed, the comments to the Rule were changed to reflect the
enhanced responsibilities lawyers owed clients, which were organizations. Nonetheless, the Task
Force indicated that the revised Model Rule 1.13 should not be viewed as "a guide to best legal
practices." See Proposed Amendments to Model Rules and Other Materials on the ABA Presiden-
tial Task Force on Corporate Responsibility's Website, at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw
/corporateresponsibility/home.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
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The Report for the ABA House of Delegates contained some important
observations concerning the relationship between outside counsel and corporate
clients. The Report noted that in addition to boards of directors, public account-
ing firms, and shareholders, private sector participants "[I]egal counsel who
provide advice to public corporations, through their directors, officers and em-
ployees, on compliance with the corToration's legal obligations" play a vital role
in effective corporate governance. Unfortunately, some lawyers do not ade-
quately protect their corporate clients' interests, perhaps because their relation-
ships are with individuals (each with their own interests and perceptions, rather
than their organizational client - a fictional person). The Report candidly states
that "[tlhe competition to acquire and keep client business, or the desire to ad-
vance within the corporate executive structure, may induce lawyers to please the
corporate officials with whom they deal rather than to focus on the long-term
interests of their client, the corporation.
' 31
In a resolution, the ABA House of Delegates approved the twelve rec-
ormendations (or practices) originally proposed by the Task Force. The rec-
ommendations primarily covered two areas: "(1) the role of lawyers in facilitat-
ing the flow of information and analysis concerning legal compliance issues
within the organizations they represent (including public corporations); and (2)
the limitations on the ability of the lawyer to disclose to third parties informa-
tion concerning criminal or fraudulent conduct by the client." 32
As noted above, a majority of the ABA House of Delegates' recom-
mendations proposed practices concerned the behavior of corporate personnel
and corporate structure. The most important recommendations concerning the
role of lawyers were:
- A lawyer representing a public corporation shall serve the in-
terest of the entity, independent of any personal interest of any
particular director, officer, employee or shareholder. (Recom-
mendation 5).33
- Public corporations should adopt practices in which . . . (c)
[a]ll reporting relationships of internal and outside counsel for a
public corporation establish at the outset a direct line of com-
munication with general counsel through which these lawyers
are to inform the general counsel of material potential or ongo-
30 Task Force Report submitted by the ABA House of Delegates in support of the Governance
Policy Resolution, at 7, (August 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003
/journal/1 19c.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
31 Id.
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ing violations of law by, and breaches of fiduciary duty to, the
corporation (Recommendation 7(c)).
34
- Engagement of counsel by the board of directors, or by a
committee of the board, for special investigations or independ-
ent advice should be structured to assure independence and di-
rect reporting to the board of directors or the committee (Rec-
ommendation 9).35
- The courts, law schools and lawyer professional responsibility
organizations such as the ABA should promote awareness of,
and adherence to, the professional responsibilities of lawyers in
their representation of public corporations (Recommendation
1l).36
- Law firms and law departments should adopt procedures to
facilitate and promote compliance with rules of professional
conduct governing the representation of public corporations
(Recommendation 12).
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to predict, with any confi-
dence, the impact of these recommendations on the conduct of lawyers if they
were adopted and put into practice. To evaluate whether the relevant actors are
implementing the recommendations would require a major research effort in-
volving extensive fieldwork. Merely sending out surveys, which were not sub-
sequently verified, would be insufficient and likely to produce misleading re-
sults. One would have to confirm not merely whether written policies have been
adopted, but whether they were in fact being observed, and if so to what degree.
It may be significant that the ABA House of Delegates' resolution in the
last point used the permissive word "should," rather than the mandatory com-
mand "shall." Although there may be a number of explanations for this, it is
noteworthy that the Delegates felt more comfortable suggesting mandatory prac-
tices of corporate governances for corporations in lieu of establishing require-
ments concerning the management of law firms. It at least reflects the ABA's




37 See supra note 5, at 31-32.
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III. ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE WHEN THE CLIENT IS A CORPORATION
The Model Rules do not overlook the situation where the client is an or-
ganization; they merely treat the topic in a cursory manner.38 The Model Rules
38 Model Rule 1. 13 and the accompanying comment are rather lengthy, which is indicative of
the complexity of providing legal services to organizations. This Rule provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in [an] action, intends to
act or refuse to act in a manner related to the representation that is a violation
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is rea-
sonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organiza-
tion to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the or-
ganization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest author-
ity that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists or fails
to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to
act, this is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may re-
veal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6
[Confidentiality of Information] permits such disclosure, but only if and
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent sub-
stantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a law-
yer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of
law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee, or other constituent
associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged vio-
lation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged be-
cause of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c) or who
withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action
under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary to assure that the organizations highest authority is informed
of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the
client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organiza-
tion's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer
is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its direc-
tors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject
to the provisions of Rule 1.7 [Conflict of Interest: Current Clients]. If the or-
ganization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the
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are most relevant to the litigation context. Lawyers working for corporate cli-
ents, however, are often structuring transactions, looking at complex securities
issues, examining difficult tax questions, and resolving regulatory 
matters. 39
Since the Model Rules can't possibly address all the ethical issues aris-
ing from a wide range of legal matters, it often relies on vague language and
makes frequent use of the words "reasonable" and "reasonably." This makes
the Model Rules understandably nuanced and frequently open to interpretation.
Consequently, the Model Rules (and their state equivalents) are of less practical
value than might be the case since the authors seemed to have drafted them as if
the client is generally an individual or closely-held company, where the man-
agement and owners of the entity have similar, if not identical, interests. 40 In
any event, the Model Rules relating to this area are frequently ambiguous and
often of little relevance to the realities of law firm corporate practice in the
transactional area.
The Restatement examines the duties of lawyers who represent organ-
izational clients, but only have contact with the organization's constituents (e.g.,
management or the board of directors). The text of the Restatement is compati-
ble with the requirements flowing from the Model Rules. It provides:
(1) When a lawyer is employed or retained to represent an or-
ganization:
(a) The lawyer represents the interests of the organization
as defined by its responsible agents acting pursuant to the
organization's decision-making procedures; and
(b) Subject to Subsection (2), the lawyer must follow in-
structions in the representation, as stated in § 21.2 [dealing
consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than
the individual who is to be represented or by the shareholders.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002). As is often the case, a particular jurisdiction
does not adopt a particular Model Rule in its entirety. See e.g. D.C. Rules of Prof'I Conduct, R.
1.13, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/legal-ethics/rulesofjprofessional
conduct/Rule one/ruleOl 13.cfm.
39 According to Deborah Rhode and Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., most legal practice today occurs in
transactional settings. Deborah L. Rhode & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY AND REGULATION 79 (2002).
40 The ABA takes the view that a lawyer's non-compliance with the Model Rules does not
constitute malpractice per se. ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Preamble and Scope; see also
Michelle Craven and Michael Pitman, To the Best of One's Ability: A Guide to Effective Lawyer-
ing, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 983, 996 (2001). Nonetheless, such non-compliance can serve as
evidence of legal malpractice. Unlike the ABA Model Rules, The Restatement of the Law
(THIRD) of the Law Governing Lawyers deals with the topic of the liability of lawyers for their
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with the allocation of authority between a client and a law-
yer], given by persons authorized so to act on behalf of the
organization.
(2) If a lawyer presenting an organization knows of circum-
stances indicating that a constituent of the organization has en-
gaged in action or intends to act in a way that violates a legal
obligation to the organization that will likely cause substantial
injury to it, or that reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable
to ... it, the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably
believes to be the best interests of the organization.
(3) In the circumstances described in Subsection (2), the lawyer
may, in circumstances warranting such steps, ask the constituent
to reconsider the matter, recommend that a second legal opinion
be sought, and seek review by appropriate supervisory authority
within the organization, including referring the matter to the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization.
4 1
While the documents establishing the specific rules that form the basis for cor-
porate governance vary slightly from corporation to corporation, in theory, the
shareholders hold the ultimate, though frequently ineffective, power to deter-
mine how the corporation is to operate; in practice, a corporation's board of
directors performs the critical function of overseeing management's actions and
providing strategic insights/objectives. These provisions of the Restatement,
like the Model Rules in general, do not seem to adequately address circum-
stances where the lawyer practices within a large law finn, the very type of
structure likely to have large corporate clients.
This is of great practical importance for lawyers because the Model
Rules sometimes refer to the "highest" authority within an organization, but the
lawyer may not have ready access to this authority. Rather, the lawyer is far
more likely to take his instructions from a lawyer within the office of general
counsel, or some other subordinate official. Also, query whether the "highest
authority" is the chief executive officer, the chairman of the board of directors,
or the annual meeting of shareholders. The answer may vary by jurisdiction.
This situation is not academic. The so-called "agency problem" consti-
tutes the principal shortcoming of U.S. corporate governance. The agency prob-
lem arises since most shareholders in publicly traded companies (i.e. the own-
ers) act in a passive fashion, and if they are unhappy with the performance of a
company, will sell their shares - that is, they will not usually be interested in
improving the management of the company (though they may end up as plain-
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 (2001) (emphasis added);
see also the corresponding Comments and Reporter Notes.
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tiffs in a class action law suit if corporations or directors do not follow relevant
legal norms).
Boards of Directors typically focus on their relationship with corporate
management rather than their role as the shareholders' agent. Furthermore,
board members are usually dependent on management for the information on
which they base their decisions. This situation has changed somewhat following
the enactment of the SOX, since Boards of Directors and Audit Committees
have become more independent and assertive.
42
The Restatement discusses briefly the appropriate manner for lawyers to
overcome the agency problem.43 According to traditional corporate governance
theory, management is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the corpora-
tion, while the board of directors conducts oversight over management and of-
fers the company some strategic direction. In addition, the board may initiate
investigations and establish special committees to examine particular areas of
concern.
In recent years, boards of directors were often ineffective because they
were dependent on management for the information on which they are to make
decisions, had personal ties to management, or treated their responsibilities in a
lackadaisical fashion. Ultimately boards were not independent of management.
This phenomenon has been termed "board capture."
44
Ultimately, both management and the board are responsible to the cor-
poration's shareholders. The shareholders meet at least annually to adopt reso-
lutions on topics such as proposed mergers, elections of the board, and other
issues identified in the corporation's governing documents. In practice, how-
ever, most shareholders are not well informed about the activities of thc corpo-
rations in which they hold shares. The majority of shareholders vote by proxy
to approve the board's recommendations, or do not vote at all. Few sharehold-
42 Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. CrN. L. REV. 117, 119 (2003) (discussing the tensions between agency and
corporate law, both of which require properly informed actors); John M. Holcomb, Corporate
Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues and Global Comparisons, 32 DENy. J.
INT'L. L. & POL'Y 175, 179 (2004) (discussing SOX's impact on the elements of good govern-
ance, in particular the regulation of lawyers, and proposing additional measures for improvements
in this area drawing from experiences in other countries). See also, ROBERT A. G. MONKS AND
NELL MINOR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 25 (3rd Ed., 2004); Henry Hannsmann & Reinier R.
Kraackman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies and The Basic Governance Structure, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATELAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21-70 (Reinier R.
Krackman ed., 2004); JOHN L. COLLEY, JR., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128 (2004).
43 James L. Gunderson, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel 1: The Collapse of the Corporate Model, speaking at a
symposium held at Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 22, 2002) in 52 AM.
U.L. REV. 579, 584-85 (2003); see generally Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 14 at 22.
44 Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,




Burger: Who Is the Corporation's Lawyer
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ers attend meetings. Shares held by mutual funds are usually not voted. Some
entities such as TIA-CREFF and CALPERS, however, played a more active role
in most shareholder activity.45 As noted above, many shareholders simply "vote
with their feet," in that they sell shares in underperforming companies.
The Model Rules, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Rules 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3), seem to ignore the peculiarities of practicing law within a large organiza-
tion where the lawyers' interests can diverge and their views of a particular mat-
ter differ. This leads to a situation where the Model Rules are not always
enlightening for subordinate attorneys who are working on tasks for their firm's
corporate clients.
In many instances, subordinate attorneys have minimal or no client con-
tact. Therefore, it should not be surprising that subordinate lawyers would be
reluctant to contact the management of clients directly if they feel that their firm
is not serving the corporate client's best interests. As a result, the Model Rules
and their Comments are of limited practical use to a lawyer seeking to under-
stand his obligations to corporate clients.
The state supreme courts have the ultimate authority to regulate the
practice of law within their respective state's borders. Traditionally, lawyers
have been relatively successful in persuading state supreme courts, state legisla-
tures, 4 6 and bar counsel to adopt rules and issue opinions largely favorable to the
legal community's interest as a whole. This is often achieved at the expense of
45 Corporate Governance, Ending the Wallstreet Walk: Why Corporate Governance Now?
(available at http://www.corpgov.net/forums/commentary/ending.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005)
(discussing the role of pension funds such as TIA-CREF and CALPERS in increasing corporate
accountability to shareholders); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance: Convergence
of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 346-47 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, CALPERS
Six General Principles concerning accountability in corporate governance).
46 There is a common misperception that a majority of legislators were trained as lawyers, but
this apparently is not true. According to Professor Benjamin Barton, only 15% of state legislators
in 1995 were lawyers. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market? 37 GA. L. REv.
1167, 1219 (2003) (suggesting that legislatures and not state supreme courts should regulate law-
yers since "these justices are too busy, too connected and sympathetic to lawyers, and too inacces-
sible to the public to do any more than allow bar associations and lawyers almost total control of
the system." Id. at 1246. He contends that while lawyer-lobbyists may have considerable influ-
ence over state legislatures or Congress, the public may be able to serve as a counterweight. Id.)
According to data appearing on the website of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America, a majority of the U.S. Senate were trained as lawyers, while slightly less than half of
the Democratic members of the House of Representatives worked as lawyers prior to being
elected; the figure for Republican members is approximately one-third. See Chris Townsend,
Where do These People Come From?, available at http://www.ranknfile-ue.org/capst07.html
(last visited Aug. 27, 2004). See Kelley R. Ross, A Modest Proposal: Separation of Lawyers and
Politics, available at http://www.friesian.com/lawyers.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (perhaps
partially in jest, Dr. Ross, the Libertarian Party Candidate for California's 28 t1h Congressional
District, proposed that in order to reduce the political power of lawyers in general, lawyers (from
private practice) should either not be permitted to hold elective office, or be required to win elec-
tion by a supermajority).
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the public, which includes corporate shareholders and other stakeholders (whose
interests are often overlooked in courtrooms, legislatures, and administrative
agencies).
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SUBORDINATE ATTORNEY & THE
CORPORATE CLIENT
A. Theory & Practice
Most law firms are organized as pyramids with respect to both man-
agement and compensation. While law firms have different categories of law-
yers ((i) partner, (ii) non-equity partner, (iii) of counsel, (iv) senior associate,
and (v) associate), this differentiation is not adequately addressed in the Model
Rules.4 7 Within a law firm, not all partners (members) have equal rights, bene-... 48
fits and responsibilities. A lawyer's managerial and substantive role within a
law firm can be complex and change over time as well as vary from matter to
matter. The Model Rules do not reflect this reality. They simply divide lawyers
into two categories: the subordinate lawyer and the supervisory lawyer ignoring
the intricacies (and intrigues) of law firm practice (including client relations).
Model Rule 5.2 - Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer, provides:
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another
person.
47 See Douglas R. Richmond, Subordinate Lawyers and Insubordinate Duties, 105 W. VA. L.
REv. 449, 451-452 (2003) (discussing the obligations of subordinate and supervisory lawyers
under the ABA Model Rules and the Restatement); see also Susan Saab Fomey, Are Law Firm
Partners Islands unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 60
TEX. B. 1. 1056, 1057-60 (1997) (discussing the results of a survey of law firms about their peer
review policies and the reliance placed by managing partners and law firm principals on limited
liability firms to reduce exposure to vicarious liability for the legal malpractice of others).
48 See David S. Hilzenrath, Law Firm Accused of Discrimination, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 14,
2005, at El (discussing that "partners" at the law firm Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, who were
forced into retirement by the law firm's management committee, were "employees" and not "em-
ployers" for the purposes of the Age Discrimination Act in Employment; see also Sid Steinberg,
Business of Law on Trial in EEOC v. Sidley Austin, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Vol. 232, No. 27,
at 5 (February 9, 2005) (discussing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's' law suit
against a law firm managed as if it were a corporation on the grounds that former "partners" were
illegally demoted as a result of age discrimination).
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(b) The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervis-
ing lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a
firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
49
Read at face value, subordinate lawyers cannot violate the Model Rules by as-
serting that they were following the instructions of more senior lawyers. The
analysis, however, does not end here.
50
Comment Two to this Rule indicates that when carrying out a task re-
quiring "professional judgment as to an ethical duty," the supervised lawyer can
defer to a supervisory lawyer's directive if"reasonable." While reasonable per-
sons can disagree, if the supervisory lawyer's view is not clearly incorrect, it can
be followed and the supervisory lawyer will assume responsibility for the sub-
ordinate lawyer's actions.
Model Rule 5.1 - Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervi-
sory Lawyers provides:
49 MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2002).
The Comment to Rule 5.2 provides:
[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the
fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be
relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to ren-
der conduct a violation of the Rules. For example... [a] subordinate would
not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the
document's frivolous character.
[2] When lawyers in a supervisory-subordinate relationship encounter a matter
involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume
responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise, a consistent course of ac-
tion or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be an-
swered [in] only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are
equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably ar-
guable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority or-
dinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided ac-
cordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two cli-
ents' conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the
question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is sub-
sequently challenged.
MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2 cmt. 1-2 (2002) (emphasis added).
50 See Rachel Reiland, Note, The Duty to Supervise and Vicarious Liability: Why Law Firms,
Supervising Attorneys and Associates Might Want to Take a Closer Look at Model Rules 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1151, 1152-53 (2001) (observing that "[d]espite the imposing
language of Rule 5.1 and the specter of numerous disciplinary actions raised by its reference to
'all [of the] rules of professional conduct,' Rule 5.1 is seldom read, enforced, or mentioned in
disciplinary proceedings." The author urges that these rules be re-examined to make them more
effective, presumably by increasing the consequences of their violation. [citation omitted]).
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(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial
authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific
conduct ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial
authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer prac-
tices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other law-
yer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take rea-
sonable remedial action.
5 1
51 MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2002).
The Comment to Model Rule 5.1 provides:
[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the
professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of a part-
nership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corpora-
tion, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers
having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a
law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have
intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to
lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a
firm.
[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to
make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed
to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those
designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which ac-
tions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property
and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.
[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed
in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its prac-
tice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and peri-
odic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice.
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Rule 5. 1(a) can be read as making all supervisory attorneys directly responsible
for ensuring that proper ethical (and risk management) systems are in place to
avoid another attorney's violation of the Model Rules. 52 Furthermore, law firm
partners' views may differ on vital issues such as the appropriate manner to
structure the firm's management, the best approach to take on a particular mat-
ter, or whether it is desirable for the law firm to represent a specific client.
In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems fre-
quently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for
example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential re-
ferral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special
committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on
continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical at-
mosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the part-
ners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably
conform to the Rules.
[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for
acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).
[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having com-
parable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct
supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another law-
yer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is
a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at
least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a part-
ner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory
responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Ap-
propriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on
the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the mis-
conduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable conse-
quences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred.
Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a mat-
ter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordi-
nate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.
[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a vio-
lation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it
does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction,
ratification or knowledge of the violation.
[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary
liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a law-
yer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a ques-
tion of law beyond the scope of these Rules.
[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do
not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of
Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).
MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmts. 1-8 (2002).
52 Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 17-20
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Perhaps of greater significance with respect to behavior is that attorneys
typically have different financial stakes in the outcome of a particular law firm
decision (such as taking on a new client, agreeing to handle a matter outside the
firm's traditional area of practice, etc.).53  Another factor not to be ignored is
that individual attorneys may be affected by their particular financial circum-
stances when making decisions involving the law firm as a whole. In fact, an
attorney's dependence on a particular client may affect the lawyer's ability to
provide independent and unbiased advice since such advice, if viewed as too
negative or cautious by corporate management, may lead to a change in outside
counsel.
54
Financial considerations, the priority given to ethical concerns, and the
role of law firm management are not static factors. Law firms that are having
difficulty keeping their attorneys busy may be more inclined to take on work in
areas that under other circumstances they would refuse. Firms undergoing
structural changes may be reluctant to take on new matters. These factors can
make a law firm's role in a particular corporation's operations unpredictable (or
incapable of reliably playing the gatekeeper role).
Perhaps the most significant variable affecting law firm behavior is how
it compensates its equity holders. Depending on the compensation system util-
ized, its principal beneficiaries may deliberately underestimate the risks or con-
sequences to the law firm associated with pursuing the objectives of a client's
management to ensure that it remains satisfied and continues to use the law
firm's services. For example, some law firms pay their equity partners accord-
ing to a fixed formula based on their tenure at or contribution to the law firm;
others offer major incentives such as a high percentage of the law firm's billings
(attribution) to the lawyer who generated the client.
53 Professor Schneyer has proposed that law firms be subject to liability in the way that corpo-
rations may be held criminally liable. Id. at 8-13, 28. One of the rationales for this idea is to pe-
nalize the law firm for its "firm culture," where it is not possible to identify one or a small group
of lawyers who contributed to a violation of the rules of professional conduct. Id. Professor
Schneyer contends that the reason that the majority of the lawyers who are disciplined are either
solo practitioners or lawyers at small firms is the difficulty of identifying the lawyer at fault in a
large law firm where "group practice is the norm." Id. See also Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four
Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the 'Ethical Infrastructure' of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX.
L. REv. 245 (1998). Contra Julie Rose 0' Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A
Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1, 31-41 (2002). Professor
O'Sullivan believes that the most effective system is where individuals know they are at risk of
being disciplined and is skeptical that the "entity can be the culprit."
54 Nancy B. Rapopon, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Enron, Titanic, and the
Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1385-87 (2003) (discussing the concepts of "Moral
Independence" versus "Moral Interdependence," and its role in bringing about Enron's collapse by
not acting as a gatekeeper.) University of Houston Law School Professor Dean Rapoport observes
that "[1]awyers need to behave as true counselors to their clients, rather than as hired guns who are
just following orders." Professor David Luban has termed the reluctance of lawyers to dissuade a
client from taking a particular course of action as "advocacy to excess." David Luban, Integrity its
Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 287-89 (2003).
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Salaried attorneys, such as associates, non-equity partners, and some of
counsel, are probably less likely than a law firm's equity holders to have their
independent legal judgment "influenced" by suspect aims of corporate manage-
ment. Nonetheless, a law firm's profitability can still exercise an indirect effect
on such lawyers' compensation and/or promotion. Thus they may still be reluc-
tant to say "no" to a corporation's management that is willing to "push the enve-
lope."
According to Southern Illinois University School of Law Professor
Leonard Gross, a law firm associate is:
both a servant and a sub-agent. The associate owes fiduciary
obligations to the law firm consistent with those that servants
and agents traditionally have owed to principals. Thus, the law
firm associate owes the following duties, among others, to the
law firm by which he is employed: good care and skill, loyalty,
and obedience.
55
Unfortunately, these duties may conflict with a lawyer's duties to his client.
Such conflicts may arise with respect to billing practices. Each attorney exer-
cises considerable discretion when accounting for his or her billable time. Some
attorneys write down their time on their own to reflect that they are not experi-
enced in a given area or simply did not approach the matter in the most effective
matter.
It is not unusual for law firms to tell associates to account for all their
time and rely on the billing partner to make appropriate adjustments. This as-
sumes that the billing partner can accurately evaluate the time needed to perform
a specific task. Furthermore, the billing partner must be willing to accept the
consequences of writing off unproductive time - which may cost him or the firm
money. It is difficult to assess based on limited knowledge whether a particular
bill is excessive because a task may be more difficult than originally expected.
Sometimes the billing partner incorporates an associate's time into his
own or that of another attorney so that fewer attorneys are identified as working
on a particular matter. Ideally, the partner will make such "adjustments" while
ensuring that the cost to the client is the same as otherwise would be the case.
Nonetheless, the transfer of time expended from one attorney to another can
produce a variety of issues apart from potential ethical issues. The partner may
not have as thorough an understanding of a particular issue that the associate
who worked on it had. This means that the client may assume that the partner is
better informed about the matter than he is in fact.
The degree to which in-house counsel scrutinizes a law firm's bill
greatly varies. It is by no means clear that a particular in-house counsel is com-
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petent to judge the time needed to complete certain tasks and whether the task
was essential. Ultimately, this becomes a matter of whether the amount billed to
the client seems justified. The law firm, in many instances, has both financial
and liability concerns that create incentives to "over lawyer" a particular matter.
Not surprisingly, billing disputes can poison a law firm's relationships with cli-
ents. To reduce the risk of such disputes, the responsible partners needs to see
that projects are properly handled and that clients be kept informed about the
progress of work being performed for their benefit as well as any unforeseen
problems.
There is a widespread concern among many consumers of legal services
that lawyers (most often associates) "pad" their hours.56 This practice may be
more common at large law firms servicing corporate clients. A factor contribut-
ing to this problem (apart from the incentive structure within the law firm) is
that so long as the total cost of legal services procured by in-house counsels
remains within budget for the relevant time period, there often is no incentive
for the corporation to contain expenses. In fact, if a corporation's office of gen-
eral counsel does not spend all the funds allocated to it, the likelihood that its
budget will be reduced in the future is increased. These are some of the factors
reducing the likelihood that law firm bills are contested and associates do not
encounter repercussions for their actions as their conduct may not be closely
monitored.
Nonetheless, as Professor Gross has noted:
[i]n addition to the fiduciary duties that the associate owes to
his law firm, the associate has other responsibilities. He owes a
fiduciary duty to the client on whose behalf he is working. His
duty to the client is much the same as if he were the attorney in
charge of the representation. The bases for this responsibility
can be found in the law of agency and in the attorney's profes-
sional duty to the client as set forth in the various codes of pro-
56 Many associates react to the pressure to bill excessive hours by aggressive billing practices
that may border on larceny. See Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and
Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 293-300 (1999) (presenting the results
of a study suggesting a high level of padding, manipulating, and fabricating time sheets and ex-
pense vouchers); Daniel Schweimler & Reena Sengupta, A Question of Time and Money: Billable
House: The Clifford Chance Memo Has Thrown Harsh Light on Lawyers; Charging Practices,
THE FINANCIAL TIMES, *19; see also David Callahan, THE CHEATING CULTURE: WHY MORE
AMERICANS ARE DOING WRONG TO GET AH4EAD 33-42 (2004) (seeing the decline of legal ethics of
lawyers as reflecting a larger cultural phenomenon); but see William J. Wernz, The Ethics of
Large Law Firms - Responses & Ethics, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175 (2002) (arguing that corpo-
rate counsel should scrutinize large law firm's bills, preventing fraudulent billing in most cases;
the author believes that overall the quality of legal work today is excellent).
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fessional responsibility. In many situations, the associate also
has a duty to the public, or at least to a segment of the public.
57
Unfortunately, the associate's connection to the "public" may be nebulous and
direct interactions with the client superficial or non-existent. Since the Model
Rules often call on the lawyer to decide what is "reasonable" under a particular
set of circumstances, the lawyer can be tempted to take the path of least resis-
tance and conform the unethical billing practices at the law firm.
Professor Mona L. Hymel proposed addressing issues such as these by
moving away from reliance on the interpretation of general ethical rules5 8 and
the adoption of specific guidelines or protocols analogous to those used by the
medical profession. 59 Perhaps, such guidelines might address the manner by
57 Id. at 267.
58 According to Professor Hymel, the state codes of professional ethics
serve two broad goals. First, they serve a disciplinary function. Second, legal
ethics codes provide guidance to lawyers in resolving ethical dilemmas.
Through their standards and rules, state ethics codes furnish principles that are
designed to guide lawyers in maintaining good lawyer-client relationships,
conducting transactions with non-clients, and maintaining the integrity of the
profession. The guidance provided applies to all lawyers, regardless of spe-
cialization.
Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Protocols in Governing
Law Practice, 44 ARiz. L. REv. 873, 879 (2002) (citations omitted).
59 In her article, Professor Hymel uses the word 'protocol' to mean specific guidelines or rules
that govern the practice of law. Professional organizations and agencies could develop such pro-
tocols to govern the conduct of their members or lawyers practicing for them. See id. at 873-74.
Medical protocols (procedures) are followed in processing trauma patients in emergency rooms
for purposes of diagnosis and treatment. See New York Trauma Protocol Resources, available at
http://www.nyerrn.com/er/tg.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
Professor Hymel advances three rationales for developing protocols to replace the states'
ethical rules that are largely derived from the Model Rules.
First, although more lawyers are now counselors than litigators, state ethics codes are still
largely based on the model of the lawyer as advocate. Unlike traditional lawyer/client relation-
ships in the adversary system, where the lawyer's duties run almost exclusively to clients, the
transactional lawyer, in many cases, may have or be perceived to have obligations that run to third
parties. Furthermore, issues regarding to whom the corporate lawyer owes his or her loyalty
within the corporate structure often arise. As transactional/corporate practices grow and become
more elaborate, the model of "lawyer as advocate" becomes increasingly irrelevant. Existing
ethics codes do almost nothing to clarify the lawyer's responsibilities to non-clients when working
in the corporate context. But regulatory agencies like the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] and
OTS [Office of Thrift Supervision] can tailor specialized rules and enforcement practices to tax
and banking lawyers with minimal vagueness or internal contradiction. Furthermore, because
these rules apply primarily to corporate practice, agency rules can take into account corporate
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which the cost for legal services are generated, rather than merely stating that
they should be reasonable.
Since legal practice has become so specialized, Professor Hymel per-
suasively argues that such guidelines or protocols should be carefully tailored
for different practice areas. Given that lawyers are regulated at the state level,
and rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, an effort should be made to
make these guidelines uniform (though there probably is a need for adjustments
corporate clients, with their superior ability to monitor and control lawyer
conduct, have the power both to press their lawyers to act in ways that
jeopardize systemic norms and the rights of third parties, and to protect
themselves against any loss of zealous advocacy or individual autonomy
that might otherwise follow from an increase in external regulation.
Second, state ethics regimes do not regulate firms. As firms grow and become more decen-
tralized, and as lawyers frequently move from one firm to another, accountability for ethical viola-
tions is weakened. This situation is made even more complex on matters having a nexus with
more than one state or country since it is often unclear which jurisdictions ethical rules apply.
Lawyers are always bound by ethical rules of the state in which they are admitted. Furthermore,
by becoming more specialized and compartmentalized, lawyers in large law firms know little
about firm colleagues and clients outside their own narrow area of expertise. Thus, unscrupulous
lawyers and clients operate unimpeded when one obvious source of oversight is overlooked - the
firm. Regulation within a firm through its own internal procedures can be an efficient policing
mechanism. The OTS, SEC and the IRS have not overlooked this fact and have not hesitated to
impose regulations and sanctions on law firms.
Third, specific rules work well in addressing the problems associated with corporate law
practice and large law firms. [University of Illinois College of Law Professor] Richard Painter
suggests that protocols (which he calls tailored rules) need to be more common-place because
"[t]ailored rules for problems unique to particular practice areas also may be easier to draft, easier
to muster political support for, and easier to enforce than pure majoritarian rules.' He concludes
that the '[r]epresentation of organizational clients is one area that badly needs tailored rules.' The
recent Enron bankruptcy highlights the problems with representing organizations that have
plagued regulators in the past. Judge Stanley Sporkin articulated several key problems in the S&L
crisis that also appear to be factors in the Enron bankruptcy. For example, in corporate practice,
determining to whom the lawyer owes her loyalties is complicated (i.e., shareholder derivative
suits). The lawyer's duties may not be clear when conflicts arise between management, corporate
shareholders and the board of directors. In addition, when public documents such as registration
statements are prepared, the lawyer's disclosure duties are not clear. Furthermore, a whole host of
problems arise when dealing with regulatory agencies, such as whether lawyers may use litigation
tactics to delay agency investigations or inquiries. Thus, agency regulators, who responded to the
S&L crisis with protocols, are likely to respond in a similar fashion to the most recent wave of
corporate scandals. Hymel, supro note 58 at 884-86 (footnotes omitted).
60 Legal practice, however, has gotten so specialized that it makes it impossible to adopt sepa-
rate guidelines for each particular area of the law. Id. Consequently, there will probably be a
need for a set of generalized guidelines and when feasible, specific guidelines, e.g. banking, do-
mestic real estate, intellectual property, international transactions, securities, tax, etc. Id. Of
course, certain activities do not fit cleanly into one category. Id. Therefore several sets of guide-
lines may apply at the same time. To some extent, the different set of guidelines already exists in
the form of agency regulations at the federal level. Id. at 891-904.
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to reflect differences in the cost of living in within the country). Currently, cor-
porate law is largely determined at the state level. Given that public corpora-
tions must make federal filings with the SEC and that most conduct business
across state lines, would it not be unreasonable for all issuers of securities to be
governed by federal corporate law?
Professor Hymel contends that a change of approach is desirable since
the ethical rules generally:
(i) address issues that arise more frequently in the litigation
context, but today lawyers as a group spend more time as coun-
selors and transaction attorneys than as litigators;
(ii) inadequately reflect what occurs at larger decentralized law
firms; and
(iii) are incompatible with the management structure for many
contemporary law firms.
6 1
Her critique is essentially accurate. To identify what changes are necessary in
the ethical rules, it is important to view the situation both from the client's as
well as the lawyer's prospective. This methodology may bring to light certain
complexities that otherwise might not be adequately addressed.
V. FIXING SOME OF THE GAPS IN THE ABA'S MODEL RULES WITH RESPECT TO
CORPORATE CLIENTS
Much has been written about what are the lawyer's obligations to the
client in general and the corporate client in particular. The Model Rules' pri-
mary function is to set out the governing of the client-lawyer relationship. As
noted by the Task Force, the Model Rules' focus is on an individual lawyer.
They cover topics such as (i) competence, (ii) scope of representation and allo-
cation of authority between the client and the lawyer, (iii) communications, (iv)
fees, (v) confidentiality of information, and (vi) conflicts of interests.
Of these topics, the last two are the most difficult to regulate. Typically,
Model Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of information concerns a lawyer's obligation
not to reveal information provided by a client having an expectation of confi-
dentiality. 62 Rule 1.6(b)(3), however, contains a provision that the lawyer has
61 Id.
62 MODEL RULE PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6--Confidentiality of Information provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly au-
thorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b). A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
[Vol. 107
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the right to reveal confidential information s/he reasonably believes necessary
"to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another ......
The express language of this provision is not restricted to instances
where the attorney would be acting in furtherance of a crime or fraud. The
Comment to this paragraph emphasizes the limited nature of this exception and
refers to Model Rule 1 (d) that relates to fraud or fraudulent conduct. Thus, the
extent to which one believes that the Comment can trump the text of the Rule
appears to be a critical issue. According to the Model Rules, the Comments "do
not add obligations to the Rules, but provide guidance for practicing in compli-
ance with the Rules." 63 The Comments are not regarded as mandatory particu-
larly since the Model Rules are "rules of reason" that do not anticipate every, or
even most, situation(s).
Consequently, a lawyer working for a corporate client would (i) under
the Patriot Act and SOX be obligated to reveal confidential information to regu-
latory authorities, but (ii) under the Model Rules have "discretion" to report up
the ladder to an organization's management where there is the danger of "sub-
stantial injury," including to the corporation.
SOX's enactment has heightened awareness of who is the lawyer's (law
firm's) client.64 The legal community has been particularly concerned by the
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is rea-
sonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has re-
suited from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a crimi-
nal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
63 ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Scope 14.
64 Stephen Fraidin and Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New Realm of
Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CiN. L. REv. 609, 627-30 (2003) (analyzing the obliga-
tion of lawyers to "report up the ladder" when they believe that wrongdoing by a corporate cli-
ent's employees has or will occur and noting that while lawyers understand that when representing
a corporation, they represent the legal entity and not its officers, in practice determining the inter-
ests of the entity is not always a straightforward matter. Since corporations can only act through
"their constituents such as their officers, directors, employees, and shareholders" lawyers may
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SEC's proposed rules for SOX's "noisy withdrawal," as mandated by § 307.
This section concerns what a lawyer should do if reporting improper actions up
the ladder does not result in management taking appropriate action. If a corpo-
ration's management (or board) reacts in a manner in which a lawyer does not
feel addresses the problem(s) at issue, then management will probably choose to
deal only with those lawyers within the law firm who are less likely to challenge
management decisions. This could result in corporate management retaining
law firms that support aggressive interpretations of ambiguous laws and regula-
tions.
The practical rules in this area are open to considerable discretion. For
example, what is "appropriate action," and within what time frame must such
action be taken? Who within a law firm decides what is appropriate and what is
not? When an organization is expected to take appropriate action is discussed in
a U.S. Department of Justice memorandum.
65
According to the DOJ memorandum, the decision of whether to prose-
cute an organization (which often occurs in conjunction with the prosecution of
individuals), will depend on a corporation's culture, the operation of its regula-
tory compliance program, and how quickly management informs the appropriate
government authorities of a possible violation of law. If management waits
until the conclusion of any investigation, it may have waited too long.
Mr. Fraidin and Ms. Mutterperl have offered a defensible view of how
the Model Rules and SOX's requirements are likely to work in practice,
[A] company which has already failed to live up to its obliga-
tions is unlikely to report itself. The lack of an actual obligation
on attorneys in such a situation also would ultimately make the
"permissive" option [of noisy withdrawal] almost entirely ficti-
tious. The lawyer who is not required to take action has more
than ample reason not to do so .. . [A] lawyer will encounter
certain resistances, often from his or her own firm which might
be hesitant to lose a well paying client.
In a permissive situation, an associate or partner may easily be
talked out of taking action, especially where the lawyer is only
allowed to give the faintest hint to allow the SEC to help the
client corporation. When that is compared with the risk to hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in potential fees, the "noisy with-
have "confused allegiances." The danger being that "executive officers and other employees of
public companies may succumb to the temptation to serve personal interests in maximizing their
own wealth or control at the expense of long-term corporate well-being.").
65 Larry D. Thompson Deputy Attorney General, entitled "Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations," dated January 20, 2003. Timothy J. Coleman, Esq., Senior Counsel to
the Deputy Attorney General, made available a copy of the memorandum at the Annual Meeting
of the Association of Corporate Counsel held in Chicago on October 25, 2004.
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drawal" is not the least bit attractive to a lawyer and his or her
firm. Corrupt officers will know this.
66
What if an attorney feels that corporate management is engaging in an
activity that is not best for the corporation? First, it is necessary to define the
specific nature of outside counsel's function. Where outside counsel is retained
to address a simple issue, assist in the preparation of an SEC filing, or to paper a
particular transaction, the lawyer (law firm) has a relatively narrow set of re-
sponsibilities.
In contrast, if outside counsel serves a broader role (e.g. provided all the
legal work to the corporation and its components), where to draw the line is less
clear. Where the lawyer (law firm) is acting as a counselor, that is, providing
legal advice on a range of issues and participating in decision-making, the line
between law and business becomes less clear.
Model Rule 2.1 -Advisor, provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but also to other con-
siderations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
which may be relevant to the client's situation.67
Comment 5 to this Rule states that:
[in general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked
by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client pro-
poses a course of action that is likely to result in substantial ad-
verse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the
client under Rule 1.4 [Communication] may require that the
lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related
to the representation. 8
This avoids the questions to whom (or what) is the lawyer required to offer ad-
vice and if a lawyer's advice is ignored at a particular level such as (i) General
Counsel, (ii) Chief Executive Officer, or (iii) Board of Directors, is the lawyer
obligated to inform the shareholders, and if so how, particularly where there are
concerns about confidentiality and maintaining the value of the corporation?
Furthermore, there are competing theories of corporate governance.
One theory holds that increasing the corporation's value is the primary goal to
be pursued by management and the board of directors. The other posits that the
66 Fraidin & Mutterperl, supra, note 64 at 656.
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004).
68 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2004) (emphasis added).
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corporation must take into account the interests of all the stakeholders, not just
the shareholders. In accordance with this latter view (which is prevalent in most
European Union countries), the interests of the work force and community can-
not be ignored. Finally, taking account of all stakeholders may have a signifi-
cant impact on a corporation's value in the long term.
Gradually, there seems to be some convergence of the two corporate
governance systems, which is not merely understandable, but desirable. If a
corporation is focused entirely on the near-term - it can lead to underinvest-
ment, problems with suppliers and customers, and potentially labor/institutional
memory loss problems. In addition, it may give rise to political difficulties with
both local, state, and national level officials and politicians. In contrast, corpo-
rations that in the past operated principally on the stakeholder model sometimes
experienced difficulty in sustaining their competitiveness in the increasingly
globalized economy, in part due to high labor costs.
Irrespective of which philosophy of corporate governance is observed,
all players in corporate governance (management, board of directors and share-
holders) may each have different concepts of time for purposes of planning.
This is principally an issue for the business client to resolve, but at times law-
yers are consulted. Again, how much initiative should a lawyer show in this
area and what if all the lawyers in the firm do not share the same opinion? In
most instances, the law firm should have internal rules addressing this subject,
but this is not always the case.
Such internal rules may place principal decision-making power in (i) the
billing partner, who typically communicates directly to corporate management
on a regular basis, (ii) all the supervisory lawyers rendering services to a par-
ticular client, (iii) the firm's management or supervisory committee, or (iv) the
firm's ethics partner or ethics committee. Clearly there are different possibili-
ties and one approach might not be appropriate for all law firms.
The Model Rules make clear that each individual lawyer is bound by all
relevant ethical rules pursuant to Rule 5.2(a), but under Rule 5.2(b) a "super-
vised" lawyer may reasonably rely on a "supervisory lawyer's reasonable reso-
lution of an arguable question of professional duty." This includes Model Rule
8.3, which makes mandatory a lawyer's obligation to report the professional
misconduct of another member of the bar to the relevant authority (typically bar
counsel).
It would be undesirable to create a situation of "legal anarchy" where at-
tomeys felt morally obliged to communicate directly to a client (or component
thereof) or bar counsel. To avoid this situation, the law firm needs to establish a
viable procedure for resolving whether the supervisory lawyer's resolution of an
issue is indeed reasonable. Junior lawyers, or lawyers inexperienced in a par-
ticular field, may not have the knowledge to properly judge a situation.
The Model Rules could be improved if they explicitly provided for
whistleblower protections to ensure that attorneys are willing to act in compli-
ance with their ethical duties without running the risk of retaliation. Existing
whistleblower legislation would probably have to be strengthened for this to
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occur. Irrespective of what protections might be established, it is difficult to
create effective whistleblower protections without dedicating sufficient financial
resources to the problem.
The Model Rules also need to be revised so that the obligation to report
professional misconduct is in fact followed.69 At present, attorneys seldom re-
sort to use Model Rule 8.3, known as the "ratting provision." A lawyer's filing a
complaint about another member of the bar does not usually bring one any tan-
gible benefits (except possibly where the individual being complained about is a
competitor). It could trigger retaliation and may demand a lot of (unpaid)
time.70 "Professional misconduct" is an imprecise term and can mean different
69 Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap
for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 333 (2003) (noting that after "more than thirty years,
the ABA and the vast majority of the states have recognized lawyer reporting of professional
misconduct as a central tenet of the profession. Yet, whether by happenstance or design, the re-
porting rules adopted to achieve this goal have proved wanting.").
70 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2004) - Reporting Professional Misconduct
(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that law-
yer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall in-
form the appropriate professional authority.
(b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable
rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fit-
ness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6 or information gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in
an approved lawyers assistance program.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. (2004)
[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profes-
sion initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect
to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern
of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a
violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the
offense.
[2] A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation
of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclo-
sure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.
[3] If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure
to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a require-
ment existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule
limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profes-
sion must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, there-
fore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "sub-
stantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum
of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to the bar
disciplinary agency unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency,
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things to different people. 71 A long-term member of the bar, defended by com-petent counsel, is seldom found liable of professional misconduct for commit-
is more appropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the
reporting ofjudicial misconduct.
[41 The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer re-
tained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a
situation is governed by the Rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.
[5] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be re-
ceived by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved
lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an
exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule
encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program.
Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to
seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm
to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and
the public. These Rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of infor-
mation received by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers as-
sistance program; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules
of the program or other law.
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2004) - Misconduct states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, know-
ingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of an-
other;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency
or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a viola-
tion of applicable rules ofjudicial conduct or other law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. (2004)
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an
agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not pro-
hibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally en-
titled to take.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an in-
come tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication.
Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral
turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning
some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses,
which have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although
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ting acts arguably falling within "gray areas." Typical disciplinary cases in-
volve the improper use of client funds, lying to the court, not warning a client of
the impending expiration of the statute of limitations or the failure to make the
timely filing of a court or administrative document.
72
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND THE NEED FOR FUTURE ACTION
If lawyers are to practice in limited liability entities, they need to adopt
a form of corporate governance that reflects the best practices used in the corpo-
rate world, with appropriate additional risk management mechanisms specific to
different categories of legal practice. That being said, the corporate model of
governance cannot be transplanted into law firms without modification.
73
One option would be to require law firms above a fixed number of at-
torneys to have their own "Ethics Counsel." This individual should not have an
a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should
be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishon-
esty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice
are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor sig-
nificance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obli-
gation.
[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates
paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate
paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exer-
cised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.
[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a
good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d)
concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or applica-
tion of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond
those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inabil-
ity to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of posi-
tions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent
and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.
72 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales about the Standards for Im-
posing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1998) (describing the range of sanc-
tions imposed for disciplinary violations by lawyers and calling for better standards).
73 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for
Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 32-42, 78-80
(1999) (arguing that a "kinder and gentler" system advanced by Professor Russell G. Pearce will
not produce the needed results, refinement of the professionalism paradigm is the better approach
since lawyers have a high level of autonomy and professional discretion in rendering services to
clients. A regulatory regime to be successful requires that the group in which the lawyer works
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equity interest in the law firm, but must be senior enough to be familiar with law
firm practices sufficient to earn the respect from both experienced and junior
lawyers. 74 The Ethics Counsel's compensation should not depend on the num-
ber of hours worked or law firm profitability. Furthermore, the Ethics Counsel
should be recruited from outside the law firm to minimize the impact that per-
sonal relations might have on the individual holding the position.
Ideally, the individual should hold the position for a fixed term (e.g.,
four years). In practice, finding a qualified person to take such a job might
prove exceedingly difficult. Some law firms have already established such posi-
tions, but it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of these systems given
the diverse nature of law firm structures, practices, locations, personnel, etc.
The Ethics Counsel should oversee the law firm's conflict check system
and the production of a detailed and user-friendly ethics manual specific to the
firm. The Ethics Counsel should keep all lawyers at the firm apprised of devel-
opments involving ethics and professional responsibility. For instance, within
each jurisdiction in which the law firm has an office (or even where one of its
lawyers is admitted to the bar), the Ethics Counsel should disseminate by e-mail
and maintain on an internal website: Bar Counsel Decisions, Bar Professional
Responsibility Office's Opinions, changes in the rules of professional conduct
for all jurisdictions where the law firm's attorneys are members of the bar, sig-
nificant judicial decisions, as well as specific items applicable to particular at-
torneys' practice areas (e.g. securities, intellectual property, etc.).
Under such a scheme, all attorneys would be required to acknowledge
that they have reviewed the documents that they have been given by Ethics
Counsel. It would be difficult to assess the impact of requiring an Ethics Coun-
sel in each firm since each organization is sui generis with respect to its person-
nel, nature of practice, location, etc. Nonetheless, the creation of such an insti-
tution and giving the individual sufficient resources and power to have an im-
pact would make an important statement. The legal professional liability insur-
ance industry would appear to have an incentive to promote this system (or an-
other concept) as part of a risk management program.
An alternative approach would be for the bar to require law firms to es-
tablish an "Ethics Committee" fulfilling the functions that would be accom-
plished by an Ethics Counsel. This would reduce the possibility that one person
might be tempted to make decisions for reasons other than the merits of the
situation. Having an Ethics Committee, rather than an individual, might also be
74 Diana Bentley, Leaving Nothing to Chance - The Rise of General Counsels in Law Finns,
INT'L BAR NEWS, Vol. 58, No. 2, at 19-22 (June 2004) and Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex
World, Even Lawyers Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at C1 (both articles noting that
increasingly law firms are hiring a general counsel to "advise lawyers confronting thorny con-
flicts, [ensure] compliance with state bar association rules and [provide] advice on firm manage-
ment. While some of the largest firms have had general counsels for several years, the trend has
picked up at late, lawyers say." While this is a desirable development, some firms simply desig-
nate an existing law firm partner to take on these duties. Unfortunately, such an individual may
not be sufficiently independent as would a dedicated Ethics Counsel within the law firm).
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desirable since members would have had different areas of practice and varying
opinions on particular matters.
75
A third approach would be for the ABA to prepare and the states to
adopt versions of ethical rules appropriate to lawyers particular to different or-
ganizational structures and practices. As the nature of the practice of law has
developed along different lines, it is only reasonable that the applicable ethicalS • 76
rules would reflect this situation. Perhaps, the ABA's Standing Committee on
Lawyers Professional Liability, the National Organization of Bar Counsels, the
Association of Professional Liability Lawyers, and an appropriate unit of the
U.S. Department of Justice should undertake to make the ethical rules more
compatible with the existing practice of law. 77 Unfortunately, this task may
prove to be too complex to implement effectively.
A fourth option might require a law firm to institute a system of partner
rotation for the firm's various management bodies as well as the individual tasks
for maintaining contacts with the law firm's major corporate clients. In practice,
such a system might be difficult to institute given the importance of personal
relationships between management and lawyers working for clients.
78
Unfortunately, it is not possible to legislate or regulate morality. Even
establishing the best possible professional conduct system will not guarantee
ethical behavior by lawyers. Consequently, the best strategy for achieving de-
sirable results is to amend Model Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct
(or its state equivalent) to give it real "teeth" and actually enforce it.79 One way
of making Model Rule 8.3 meaningful would be to discipline a lawyer for fail-
ing to report misconduct by another member of the bar (such as not reporting
conduct that constitutes a crime80 or would support a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
75 See Fraidin & Mutterperl, supra note 64, at 664-66 (analyzing how such a committee might
operate).
76 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 317 (2004) (arguing in favor of having a single set of
rules governing the operations of corporation to deter the "race to the bottom."); see also Fred C.
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REv. 335 (1994) (analyzing the pros and cons of
federalizing ethical rules for lawyers, and though he generally believes that it should occur for
reasons such as the nationalization of the practice of law, multi-state litigation, client expectations,
and that federal law takes precedence over state law, he recognizes that Congress lacks experience
to do so, potentially leading to unforeseen consequences).
77 Professor Hymel has noted that the insurance carriers that issue professional liability poli-
cies to attorneys often provide their insured with manuals outlining "best practices" to help reduce
their insureds' risk of malpractice. Lawyers who work for the insurance industry could make a
valuable contribution to this effort by examining these manuals to ascertain their usefulness in
producing more practical ethical guidelines. See Hymel, supra note 58, at 911-13.
78 For a discussion of instituting a system of partner rotation within a law firm, see Fraidin,
supra note 64, at 667-70.
79 The text of Mode Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct is set out supra note 70.
80 See THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE (2004) (discussing how application
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cedure 11 sanction.) 81 Under these rules, even judges would be required to re-
port professional misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary authorities.
Others have also called for reform in this area.82 For example, Profes-
sor Arthur F. Greenbaum contends that Model Rule 8.3 is so vague and ambigu-
ous as to make it of little practical value.83 This is not simply the view of aca-
demics, but courts and the ABA as well.84 The ABA has established a Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Commis-
sion)" to review the ABA's model ethics code for judges and to recommend
revisions for possible adoption in August 2005; a similar effort should be made
for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well. 85 Such a Commission
should set as its goal the creation of a framework for professional conduct that is
relevant to the practice of law in the 21st Century. Indeed, the ABA has organ-
ized a number of "special projects," the work of which could make important
contributions in this area.
For even amended and improved rules to have a desirable impact, real
reform needs to be from the bottom up as well as the top down. Lawyers and
law firms need to recognize that problems exist in this area and must be ad-
dressed sooner rather than later.
of the "law" often does not lead to "moral" outcomes, in part as a result of our "advocacy" system
as well as the absence of moral imperatives to act in most states (unlike many European countries,
where there is a mandatory duty to rescue)).
91 Misconduct is defined in Model Rule 8.4, supra note 71.
82 Greenbaum, supra note 69, at 281. See also Peter K. Rofes, Another Misunderstood Rela-
tion: Confidentiality and the Duty to Report, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 621 (2001) (arguing that an
attorney's obligation to preserve attorney confidences can interfere with the attorney's duty to
report misconduct).
83 Greenbaum, supra note 69, at 281-83.
84 Id. at 275-88.
85 See The Joint Commission's website describing its origin, at http://www.
Abanet.org/judicialethics/about.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
86 The entities include the Joint Committee on Lawyer Regulation, the Task Force on the
Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Commission
on Multijurisdictional Practice of Law and the Ethics 2000 Commission. The Ethics 2000 Com-
mission takes the lead role in proposing revisions to the Model Rules. For a description of each of
these entities' activities, see the ABA website at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/specialprojects.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
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